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Stock brokers are entrepreneurs who incur switching costs when the change brokerage houses. 
We use Helsinki Stock Exchange data to investigate these costs by examining whether 
investors are loyal to their brokers when brokers move. We find that investors who have extant 
relationships with the new house are more likely to switch with them. New houses that are less 
active in a particular stock are more likely to attract the investors from the old houses, and 
savvy (knowledgeable) investors are more likely to stay with their broker.    
 
I. Introduction 
Important players in the secondary market for stocks are the brokers.  These individuals 
are entrepreneurs who facilitate stock trading in the upstairs and downstairs markets.  Because 
a competent support staff and technologically advanced facilities are necessary to execute 
trades in modern markets, brokers join brokerage houses that are able to provide these needed 
trading services.  Nevertheless, brokers act independently, assume business risks, and develop 
networks with other brokers within their own house as well as with brokers associated with 
other houses.  Importantly, they develop strong relationships with their clients in order to 
ensure repeat business.  Brokers sometimes change houses to increase the profitability of their 
businesses, and it is not uncommon for them to encourage their current clients to follow them 
to the new houses.  If the clients follow their brokers, they incur what Klemperer (1995) refers 
to as switching costs.  Because of these costs not all clients will switch.  Thus, similar to most 
start-up ventures, the brokers will need to attract new clients to replace the ones that they lost.  
Brokers, then, also incur switching costs.     
In this paper, we investigate switching costs in the stock brokerage industry by 
analyzing the loyalty that investors exhibit to their brokers. We ask why customers follow their 
brokers when brokers move to other brokerage houses. We posit that switching costs exist 
because investors need to communicate their trading and investment preferences to their 
brokers.  If they decide to switch brokers, they will have to educate their new brokers, which 
can be costly in terms of time and convenience.  These costs may be especially burdensome for 
investors who routinely use the upstairs market, because, as Grossman (1992) points out, 
upstairs market brokers keep track of their customers’ trading and investment needs and 
preferences, with liquidity often being an important consideration.  To answer our research 
question, we use the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE) as our laboratory and capitalize on its 
stock ownership and transaction databases. Because of public data availability our analysis is 
limited to 1996-7. 
 
II. Environment and Data  
The HSE consists of downstairs and upstairs markets.  Investors either choose the 
market where they transact or leave the decision to the broker who has the responsibility of 
obtaining the “best” price.  The downstairs market uses an open electronic limit order book that 
mandates price and time priority.  The upstairs market consists of a network of brokers and 
brokerage houses (25 at year end 1997).  If the upstairs market is used, upon receiving 
customer orders, brokers search for counterparties, finding them either among their own 
customers or among the clientele of other brokers either in the same or different brokerage 
houses.  Sometimes both the upstairs and downstairs markets are used if the order to be 
executed is especially large and needs to be broken down in order to “work” it through the 
system. The two markets are electronically linked, making all trades and related information 
available to brokers on their montage. Execution may occur either in the client’s or brokerage 
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house’s name.  If the latter, a “fictitious” trade is made in the aftermarket by the broker to put 
stocks in the client’s name.  Booth et al. (2002) show that the two markets are economically 
linked, the downstairs market providing the price discovery function. 
The HSE provides a rich source of stock transaction and ownership data.  For each 
stock transaction, the HSE Automatic Trading and Information System (HETI) records price, 
volume, time, venue, broker, and brokerage house.  The Book Entry System (BES), which is 
maintained by the Finnish Central Securities Depository (FCSD), contains each investor’s 
initial shareholdings of HSE listed companies as of January 1, 1995, and all the daily changes 
in individual stock ownership occurring since then. Specific information includes the number 
of shares and average price as well as codes that uniquely identify the Finnish investor, type of 
share, and type of ownership. Using HETI data, we identify 11 instances of a broker switching 
firms. We then combine the HETI and BES data using the following algorithm. For each 
trading day and stock, one or more buyers are paired with one or more sellers, such that the 
buyers’ total shares traded and average price, the sellers’ corresponding quantity and price, and 
the share volume and price of a transaction reported in the HETI are equal. We discard BES 
entries that cannot be unambiguously matched with counterparts in the HETI.  Similar to 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), we treat the share classes as separate stocks.  On average we 
match approximately 50% of the transactions, resulting in over 420,000 matches involving 85 
share classes of 67 firms.  Trades of less active stocks are more likely to be successfully 
matched. 
 
III. Reasons and Results 
When brokers move from one brokerage house to another, their customers face three 
primary choices as to who they will use for future transactions.  First, they can stay at the 
broker’s old house and use another broker.  Second, they can continue to do business with their 
broker but at his new house.  Finally, they can select a new broker at a different house.   
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Finnish brokerage houses attempt to exploit the second 
possibility by hiring individual brokers away from other houses to increase their market share, 
a practice permitted by Finnish law during our study period.  
Our focus is on the first two choices and we conjecture that there are two main reasons 
why investors continue to do business with their current brokers.  First, investors may have 
developed a strong business and, perhaps, even personal relationships with their brokers, 
especially if the investors are active in the upstairs market and require special expertise in 
brokering large transactions. While the investors’ sophistication (savviness) may influence the 
amount of expertise they need, the implication for the broker relationships required is unclear.  
Some savvy investors may follow their brokers to their new houses because their complicated 
investment preferences may necessitate close relationships.  Other savvy investors, wanting to 
keep sensitive investment information private, may purposely have weaker relationships with 
their brokers.  These investors may prefer to find a different broker at their extant houses.  
Observationally, the first group of savvy investors behaves similar to naïve investors who rely 
heavily on personal relationships and want to continue patronizing familiar brokers. Second, 
certain brokers and brokerage houses may specialize in a particular stock, leading investors to 
maintain their existing relationships to ensure continued access to liquidity. A competing 
explanation is that less dominant houses may have incentives to provide better customer service 
and prices in order to attract business.   




 We formally explore these conjectures using multivariate regression models. We 
measure the impact of broker switching using two dependent variables. First,  (Prop.-
Trading-Old-House) is the proportion of the trading volume of an investor’s total trading 
volume in a particular stock that is executed through the old brokerage house in month t+1 less 
the same metric in month t–1. Second,  (Prop.-Trading-New-House) is the analogous metric 
for the new brokerage house.  Each observation represents a trade by a specific investor of a 
particular stock that is executed in the upstairs or downstairs market.  Following Tucker (1964), 
our explanatory variables are behavioral and not attitudinal. Prop.-Investor-Trading-New-
House is the proportion of the value of investor trading in a stock executed by the new 
brokerage house. Upstairs-Market is a dummy variable equaling one if the trade is in the 
upstairs market, otherwise zero. Old-House-Market-Share, Switching-Broker-Market-Share, 
and New-House-Market-Share are the markka volume market shares of the stock for the old 
brokerage house (excluding the switching broker), the switching broker, and the new brokerage 
house, respectively. Following Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000, 2001) we define Savvy-Investor 
to be a dummy variable equaling one if the investor is a financial institution or non-financial 
corporation or zero if a governmental or non-profit institution or a household. Control variables 
used, for which statistics are not reported, are the logarithm of total value traded in a stock, a 
binary dummy variable indicating a buy as opposed to a sell transaction, binary dummy 
variables for all but one switching event, and binary dummy variables for each stock but one. 
Table 1 provides our Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results. Because the two 
dependent variables, namely, the decrease in an investor’s proportion of trading at the old 
brokerage house and the corresponding contemporaneous increase in the proportion at the new 
brokerage house are likely to be related, OLS estimation may yield inconsistent coefficients.  
We address this issue by using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) to estimate both 
models, and the results are similar to those reported in the paper.  According to the old 
brokerage house regression, the coefficients for Prop.-Investor-Trading-New-House and the 
New-House-Market-Share are statistically significant at least at the 5% level, while the former 
is negative and the latter is positive. The same coefficients are significant for the new brokerage 
house regression but the signs are reversed.  Also positive and significant in this regression is 
the Savvy-Investor coefficient. 
Our results indicate that investors having stronger prior trading relationships with the 
new brokerage house are more likely to reduce trading with their extant brokerage house and 
switch their business to the new house. Moreover, new brokerage houses less active in a 
particular stock are more likely to attract the investors from the switching broker’s old house. 
However, switching brokers with a greater share of the market for trading a stock do not attract 
investors from the old brokerage house.  Finally, savvy investors shift more of their trading to 
the new brokerage house than naïve investors after the broker switches to the new house. These 
findings are consistent with savvy investors having more complicated trading preferences and 
investment needs and naïve investors relying more on their current brokerage houses than on 
their brokers for trades. 
 
IV. Conclusions  
Brokers routinely engage in entrepreneurial activities.  For example, brokers that 
change brokerage houses must develop new business as well as retain their existing clientele. 
We find evidence indicating not only that investors who have pre-existing relationships with 
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the new brokerage house are more likely to follow the broker to the new house but also that the 
new house activity in a particular stock and investor savviness play important roles. Thus, we 
contribute to the sparse but growing financial economics literature that maintains that human 
capital (Zingales, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2000), relationships (Baker, 1984; Booth, Dalgic 
and Kallunki, 2006) and perceptions (Grinblatt and Keoharju, 2001; Frieder and 
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Notes: P-values for t-tests are given in parentheses, with a value of 0.000 signifying a value of 
less than 0.0005. The p-values in the first two (next four) rows are for one (two)-tailed tests. 
 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables   (Prop.-Trading-Old- 
House) 
  (Prop.-Trading-New- 
House) 
   
Prop.-Investor-Trading-New-House -0.200 (0.004) 0.172 (0.004) 
Upstairs-Market -0.007 (0.341) 0.020 (0.082) 
   
Old-House-Market-Share -0.073 (0.393) -0.025 (0.288) 
Switching-Broker-Market-Share -0.041 (0.741) 0.044 (0.671) 
New-House-Market-Share 0.937 (0.003) -1.550 (0.000) 
   
Savvy-Investor 0.046 (0.199) 0.149 (0.000) 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.204 
No. of Observations 267 267 
